Ensuring Access to Justice for Non-English-Speaking Criminal Defendants: Denial of Access to Other-Language Legal Materials or Assistance as an Extraordinary Circumstance for Equitable Tolling by Grandinetti, Megan
GRANDINETTI (FINAL) 12/1/2008 12:41:55 PM 
 
1479 
 
ENSURING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR  
NON-ENGLISH-SPEAKING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS: 
DENIAL OF ACCESS TO OTHER-LANGUAGE LEGAL 
MATERIALS OR ASSISTANCE AS AN EXTRAORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCE FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING 
Megan Grandinetti ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The United States has long been heralded a “melting pot,” a 
blend of multiple cultures striving toward the same goal: the Ameri-
can Dream.  America continually strives to be the land of the free, the 
land of diversity, and the land of acceptance—except for those who 
do not speak English.  In the United States, language barriers have 
become an increasing problem for non-English-speaking residents, 
citizens and non-citizens alike.  In the year 2000, nearly 18% of the 
population ages five and over spoke a language other than English in 
their homes, while 8.1% of the same population spoke English “less 
than very well.”1  What that means for those 8.1% of people living in 
the United States is that, day to day, they may face barriers to obtain-
ing the services they need to function in society,2 from going to the 
grocery store to navigating public transportation, or even receiving 
proper medical treatment.3   
 Non-English-speaking individuals in the United States also face 
tremendous burdens in obtaining assistance in the criminal justice 
system.4  Many procedural safeguards protect “language minorities,”5 
 ∗ J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2004, The Pennsylvania 
State University. 
 1 Hyon B. Shin, Language Use and English Speaking Ability: 2000, Census 2000 
Brief (Oct. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching Out to the Most Insular Minorities: A Proposal for 
Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 543 
(2004). 
 4 Id. (discussing the indistinguishable “babble of voices” that “language minori-
ties” face in the legal process, from retaining legal advice they can understand to ob-
taining “meaningful courtroom justice”). 
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such as the Federal Court Interpreters Act and accompanying state 
interpreter statutes.6  These safeguards are critical in providing 
“meaningful courtroom justice”7 for language minorities, but often 
they are not enough. 
Within the criminal justice system, an indigent, non-English-
speaking criminal defendant needs significant aid in the preparation 
of a post-conviction proceeding.  Every criminal defendant is entitled 
to an attorney by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution both 
for trial and for a direct appeal.8  Once a defendant has exhausted his 
direct appeal, however, he no longer has the right to an attorney, and 
if he does not have the means to employ one, he must attack his con-
viction pro se.9  Because there is no right to counsel in a post-
conviction proceeding, more than ninety percent of prisoners peti-
tioning for habeas corpus represent themselves.10
The writ of habeas corpus is a criminal defendant’s last chance 
to obtain relief in our criminal justice system.11  This opportunity is 
equally important to both English-speaking and non-English-speaking 
criminal defendants alike, as it is the only way for prisoners who have 
exhausted all remedies in state court to appeal to a federal court for 
relief from an unconstitutional incarceration.12  The “Great Writ,”13 
however, has been significantly narrowed by the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),14 which significantly 
narrowed prisoners’ ability to obtain that relief by enacting a one-year 
statute of limitations15 and by severely limiting any successive attempts 
for habeas corpus relief,16 thus allowing most prisoners only one 
chance to obtain relief. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See, e.g., Federal Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2006). 
 7 Rearick, supra note 3, at 544. 
 8 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–56 (1987) (holding that the right to 
appointed counsel extends only to the first appeal of right). 
 9 See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2006), repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-177 
(Mar. 9, 2006) (previously provided that any defendant facing the death penalty was 
entitled to counsel in federal habeas proceedings). 
 10 Peter Sessions, Note, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal 
Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1558 (1997). 
 11 Id. at 1514.  “[T]he writ of habeas corpus is a crucial link in our governmental 
structure, providing a necessary avenue of redress for individual rights when the 
criminal justice system has foreclosed all other options.”  Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 15 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). 
 16 Id. § 2244(b); see infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
GRANDINETTI (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:41:55 PM 
2008] COMMENT 1481 
 
This narrowing of habeas corpus relief created a strong barrier 
for indigent criminal defendants wishing to bring their claims.17  Un-
derstanding the procedural and substantive law well enough to bring 
one’s post-conviction claim within the one-year statute of limitations 
is a daunting task for someone with no legal education.18  For some-
one who does not understand English, bringing a post-conviction 
claim for relief is nearly impossible not simply because of his lack of 
legal background, but also because his lack of English language un-
derstanding would prevent him from learning about any of the legal 
background he would need to file a claim.19  If a non-English-
speaking criminal defendant is deprived of access to legal materials 
or legal assistance in his own language he will be unable to under-
stand not only how to apply for habeas relief but also how to comply 
with the strict requirements of the AEDPA.20
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in Mendoza v. Ca-
rey.21  It was the first circuit court to hold that a criminal defendant 
who does not speak or understand English might be entitled to equi-
table tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations if, while 
incarcerated, he was denied legal materials or legal assistance in his 
own language.22  The court thus created a new “extraordinary cir-
cumstance”23 under which an other-language defendant might obtain 
equitable tolling if he exerted reasonable diligence in attempting to 
obtain the legal materials or assistance necessary for him to know of 
the statute of limitations.24  This holding—that lack of library access 
or legal assistance in another language should constitute a ground 
for equitable tolling—seemingly conflicts with the recent holding of 
 17 Sessions, supra note 10, at 1568 (“The AEDPA . . . seriously impedes these un-
justly incarcerated men and women from vindicating their federal rights in federal 
courts.”). 
 18 Id. at 1567 (“Congress cannot reasonably expect petitioners to understand the 
complexities of their own cases, as well as those of the habeas procedural system, by 
the time the statute of limitations runs out.”); see also Thomas C. O’Bryant, Pro Se Liti-
gation Ten Years After AEDPA: The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 
306 (2006) (describing the difficulties of a pro se prisoner seeking relief prior to the 
AEDPA). 
 19 See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 20 See id. 
 21 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 22 Id. at 1069. 
 23 Id. at 1071. 
 24 Id. at 1069–70. 
GRANDINETTI (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:41:55 PM 
1482 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1479 
 
the Supreme Court in Kane v. Espitia25 that a pro se defendant has no 
positive Sixth Amendment right to law library access.26
Despite the holding in Kane, a non-English-speaking criminal de-
fendant should be entitled to law library access or legal assistance in 
his own language, based on the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in 
Lewis v. Casey.27  While Lewis does not spell out a positive right to ac-
cess for other-language criminal defendants, it does require that 
every prisoner have the capability to bring his claim to court.28  Be-
cause an other-language defendant is barred from bringing his claim 
by the “extraordinary circumstance”29 of denial of access to materials 
or assistance in his own language, he is arguably being denied the 
constitutional right under Lewis to have his claim heard.30  A possible 
constitutional deprivation undoubtedly satisfies the requisite extraor-
dinary circumstance required for equitable tolling; thus, if an other-
language prisoner asserts due diligence in attempting to obtain that 
material or assistance, he should be entitled to equitable tolling of 
the AEDPA.31  Equity also calls for this same result; it is unjust that 
someone who speaks another language and who has no knowledge of 
the AEDPA should be denied his claim simply because he was de-
prived of access to materials or assistance in his own language. 
To address the significance of the holding of Mendoza v. Carey in 
light of recent changes to habeas corpus law, Part II of this Comment 
analyzes the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the significant narrowing of 
its relief by the AEDPA.  Part III then analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on law library access in general.  Part IV addresses 
Mendoza v. Carey’s holding in light of seemingly conflicting Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and why other jurisdictions, as well as the Su-
preme Court, should allow for equitable tolling of the AEDPA for 
non-English-speaking criminal defendants who have been denied ac-
cess to legal materials or legal assistance in their own languages.  Fi-
nally, Part V discusses the policy reasons supporting equitable tolling 
in this circumstance. 
 25 546 U.S. 9 (2005). 
 26 Id. 
 27 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
 28 Id. at 355. 
 29 See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE 
GREAT WRIT AND THE AEDPA 
The Great Writ is derived from common law in thirteenth-
century England,32 but it was ingrained in U.S. history when it was 
made immortal in the Constitution.33  In 1867, the federal writ of ha-
beas corpus was extended to state prisoners as well, making federal 
relief available for anyone incarcerated in a state prison against fed-
eral law.34  The Supreme Court expanded the writ in its decisions, 
making it “a mighty river that served as a powerful force in the pres-
ervation of personal liberties.”35  The purpose of habeas corpus relief, 
and the reason for its perpetual existence in our legal system, is to al-
low prisoners to present claims of constitutional violations that oc-
curred during trial and that therefore make the incarceration uncon-
stitutional.36
After 1976, in a number of decisions, the Supreme Court began 
to curb the availability of federal habeas relief,37 both by limiting the 
writ procedurally and by limiting the number of successive claims a 
petitioner might bring.38  Despite this judicial restriction of the writ, 
however, there was never a statute of limitations during which a pris-
oner had to bring his claim for relief, nor was there a statutory re-
striction on successive attempts at habeas relief—that is, until the 
AEDPA was enacted in 1996.39
The AEDPA, the first law enacted to create a statute of limita-
tions for bringing a petition for habeas corpus relief, was enacted on 
April 24, 1996,40 in the wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing perpe-
 32 James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”?  AEDPA and Error Detection in 
Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 415 (2001). 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of the Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.”). 
 34 Max Rosenn, State Prisoner Use of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedures: The Great 
Writ—A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 341 (1983). 
 35 Id. at 353. 
 36 Karen M. Marshall, Note, Finding Time for Federal Habeas Corpus: Carey v. Saf-
fold, 37 AKRON L. REV. 549, 554 (2004). 
 37 See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding that a prisoner could 
bring claims only after “total exhaustion” of all state claims); see also Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982) (holding that a prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to 
federal court without first bringing it to an unsympathetic state court must demon-
strate “cause and actual prejudice” in order to have his claim heard). 
 38 See Rosenn, supra note 34, at 355–63 (describing “the Ebb Tide” of habeas ju-
risprudence created by the Supreme Court’s significant curbing of the right to relief 
under habeas corpus). 
 39 Liebman, supra note 32, at 416. 
 40 Sessions, supra note 10, at 1514. 
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trated by Timothy McVeigh.41  The AEDPA was promoted as a means 
of making sure that McVeigh would receive swift and “effective” pun-
ishment for the tragedy he caused.42  Despite McVeigh’s status as a 
federal prisoner, ironically the AEDPA severely limits habeas corpus 
review for state prisoners, and the one-year statute of limitations had 
no effect on McVeigh’s situation.43  Congress’s purported goal, other 
than assuring the public that McVeigh would be executed, was “to re-
duce the abuse of habeas corpus that results from delayed and repeti-
tive findings.”44  Its effect, however, is to procedurally deprive many 
criminal defendants of the ability to attack their state sentences on 
federal constitutional grounds.45
While theoretically one year should be ample time in which a 
criminal defendant may prepare his claim to present to the court, 
upon closer analysis the AEDPA presents a harsh barrier to compli-
ance for criminal defendants.46  The one-year statute of limitations 
begins to run when the prisoner has exhausted all of his remedies at 
the state level,47 which means that it begins to run as soon as a direct 
appeal of his sentence is no longer possible.48  To attempt to allow 
time for state remedy of the constitutional violation, the AEDPA pro-
vides for statutory tolling when the prisoner has “properly filed” an 
application for state post-conviction relief.49  Until the prisoner does 
so, however, the time begins to run.50  After the prisoner has “prop-
erly filed” his application for state post-conviction relief, the AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations tolls until a decision is rendered.51  If the state 
denies the prisoner relief, the time begins to run again, and the pris-
oner is then left with only the time that remained prior to filing his 
 41 Liebman, supra note 32, at 413  (“AEDPA . . . was the product of the bizarre 
alignment of three ill-starred events: Timothy McVeigh’s twisted patriotism and dis-
dain for ‘collateral damage,’ the Gingrich Revolution in its heyday, and the Clinton 
Presidency at the furthest point of its most rightward triangulation.”). 
 42 Id. at 412. 
 43 Id. at 414. 
 44 H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 45 Liebman, supra note 32, at 414 (“AEDPA’s many complications and interpre-
tive conundrums . . . are a nightmarish obstacle course for unrepresented . . . non-
capital petitioners.”). 
 46 O’Bryant, supra note 18, at 307. 
 47 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. § 2244(d)(2). 
 50 Liebman, supra note 32, at 417. 
 51 Id. 
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application—meaning 365 days minus the time he took before he 
“properly filed” his state post-conviction application.52
An application is “properly filed” within the meaning of the stat-
ute only “when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the 
applicable laws and rules governing filings.” 53  The “properly filed” 
requirement severely challenges criminal defendants in that, if their 
post-conviction appeal has not been properly filed in state court, the 
clock continues to tick.54  Even if a defendant believes that he has 
filed a timely state post-conviction appeal, and has taken all necessary 
steps to do so, the AEDPA time may still be running.55  By the time he 
has discovered that his post-conviction appeal has been improperly 
filed, he may have lost any right to bring his claim, or may not have a 
reasonable amount of time in which to apply for habeas relief.56
The AEDPA also allows most prisoners only one opportunity for 
habeas relief. 57  In most instances, prisoners have one year in which 
to bring their claims, and if they fail in court, or if they miss the one-
year deadline, they are not entitled to relief despite the fact that they 
may have suffered legitimate constitutional wrongs.58  The statute di-
rects federal courts to dismiss any “second or successive habeas cor-
pus application . . . that was presented in a prior application.”59 If the 
prisoner wishes to bring a new claim that has not previously been 
presented, the statute directs courts to dismiss the claim unless either 
(1) the Supreme Court provides a new constitutional right that is 
made retroactive or (2) underlying facts of the new claim, which must 
be able to prove the defendant innocent of the underlying offense by 
clear and convincing evidence, could not have been discovered in 
that year with due diligence.60  These strict limitations provide most 
defendants with just one chance to obtain relief and just one year in 
which they may file for it. 
Because of these harsh and final consequences and because of 
the importance of the writ of habeas corpus to our criminal justice 
system, a majority of the circuits have allowed for equitable tolling of 
the AEDPA in “extraordinary circumstances” where the defendant 
 52 Id. 
 53 Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4 (2000). 
 54 O’Bryant, supra note 18, at 305–06. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006). 
 58 Id. § 2244(d). 
 59 Id. § 2244(b)(1). 
 60 Id. § 2244(b)(2). 
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has been diligently pursuing his claim.61  The Supreme Court has 
never addressed whether equitable tolling applies in the context of 
the AEDPA, but in Pace v. DiGuglielmo62 the Court assumed arguendo 
that equitable tolling did apply in order to deny the petitioner his re-
lief.63  The Court articulated that “[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equi-
table tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that 
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraor-
dinary circumstance stood in his way.”64  Despite the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to acknowledge a right to equitable tolling under the 
AEDPA, most circuits65 have allowed for equitable tolling using the 
“extraordinary circumstances” test the Court acknowledged in Pace.66
Extraordinary circumstances for the purpose of equitable tolling 
is a very strict standard that should be applied only when “the princi-
ples of equity would make the rigid application of a limitation period 
unfair.”67  Examples of extraordinary circumstances in an AEDPA 
statute of limitations case include an attorney’s misrepresentation to 
his client that he had timely filed a complaint,68 prison officials’ in-
tentional tampering with a pro se petitioner’s habeas petition and le-
gal papers which prevented the prisoner from filing on time,69 and a 
prisoner’s failure to receive notice of denial of his state review for 
nearly four months.70
Until Mendoza v. Carey,71 the presence of a language barrier had 
not been identified as an “extraordinary circumstance” that would 
qualify a petitioner for equitable tolling, no matter how diligently a 
petitioner has been seeking his claim.72  In Cobas v. Burgess,73 the Sixth 
 61 See, e.g., Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998); see 
also Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000); Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 
F.3d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 2000); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329–30 (4th Cir. 
2000); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); Miller v. Marr, 141 
F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 210 (1998); Calderon v. U.S. 
Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 899 (1998). 
 62 544 U.S. 408 (2005). 
 63 Id. at 418 n.8. 
 64 Id. at 418. 
 65 See, e.g., LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2005); Davis v. Johnson, 
158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 66 544 U.S. at 418. 
 67 LaCava, 398 F.3d at 275–76 (quoting Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 
F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 68 Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 69 Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 70 Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F. 3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 71 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 72 See Perez v. Sherrer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16575, *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2006) 
(“[O]ne's coming from a foreign or ethnic backgrounds [sic] where English is not 
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Circuit was the first to address the issue and held that “[a]n inability 
to speak, write and/or understand English, in and of itself, does not 
automatically give a petitioner reasonable cause for failing to know 
about the legal requirements for filing his claims.”74  In that case, 
however, it was questionable whether the petitioner had problems 
with the English language, and he had also received assistance from 
other prisoners in preparing his claim.75  The court, therefore, was 
not presented with a situation where a language barrier had pre-
vented a prisoner from complying with the AEDPA. 
In United States v. Montano,76 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the 
issue briefly in a footnote and agreed with Cobas that the defendant’s 
“language difficulties” could not qualify as an extraordinary circum-
stance for the purposes of equitable tolling.77  The petitioner in that 
case, however, was represented by an attorney and had claimed that 
his problems with the English language prevented him from discover-
ing the challenge on his own.78  Similarly, in United States v. Cordova,79 
the Tenth Circuit held that “[l]ack of familiarity with the English lan-
guage does not rise to the level of a rare or exceptional circumstance 
which would warrant equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations pe-
riod.”80  In that case, the petitioner attempted to argue that he should 
be granted equitable tolling because it took him over two years to be-
come familiar enough with the English language to file a claim for 
habeas relief.81
Mendoza is easily distinguishable from all three of these opposing 
cases.  Unlike the petitioner in Cobas, the petitioner in Mendoza was 
unable, despite his efforts, to receive assistance from other inmates in 
preparing his claim until after the AEDPA deadline had passed.82  
the primary language cannot qualify as ‘extraordinary circumstances.’  A substantial 
part of inmate population does come from such backgrounds, but this limitation 
does not give rise to equitable tolling.”); see also Perez v. Johnson, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23727, *12 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2001), aff’d, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23725 
(N.D. Tex. July 6, 2001) (“Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the English language 
does not rise to the level of a rare or exceptional circumstance which would warrant 
equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitation period.”). 
 73 306 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 74 Id. at 444 (emphasis added). 
 75 Id. 
 76 398 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 77 Id. at 1280 n.5. 
 78 Id. 
 79 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32289 (10th Cir. Dec. 13, 1999). 
 80 Id. at *4. 
 81 Id. at *4–5. 
 82 Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Unlike the petitioner in Montano, the petitioner in Mendoza did not 
have access to an attorney to prepare his petition.83  In addition, the 
petitioner in Mendoza was not arguing for more time to grasp the 
English language—an entirely abstract concept, as was argued in Cor-
dova—but rather, that the prison should afford him the opportunity 
to pursue his legal claim with materials or assistance in his own lan-
guage.84
While the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits are currently in 
opposition to Mendoza’s premise—that an other-language defendant 
might be entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA—their cases all 
lack one important aspect: the law library or legal assistance that was 
requested by petitioner in Mendoza.85  While all three circuits agree, 
and Mendoza also reinforces the notion, that language barriers alone 
are not an extraordinary circumstance, none of the courts addresses 
whether access to legal materials in one’s own language is necessary 
to comply with the AEDPA, whether it is out of the petitioners’ con-
trol, and whether it is so extraordinary as to preclude their seeking of 
habeas relief. 
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING  
LAW LIBRARY ACCESS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
A positive right to law library access for criminal defendants did 
not exist until the Supreme Court’s decision in Bounds v. Smith.86  The 
Court examined whether the right of access to courts required pris-
oners to have law library access in order for them to bring legal 
claims.87  Ultimately, the Court held that “the fundamental constitu-
tional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by 
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance 
from persons trained in the law.”88  The Court also announced that 
“habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of ‘fundamental impor-
tance . . . in our constitutional scheme,’” thus highlighting the impor-
tance of habeas review in “protect[ing] our most valued rights.”89  As 
 83 Id. at 1067–68.  Mendoza ultimately was only able to file both for his state relief 
and for his federal habeas relief with the aid of Spanish-speaking inmates who pre-
pared the claims for him.  Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1068; see supra notes 71–84 and accompanying text. 
 86 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 87 Id. at 817. 
 88 Id. at 828. 
 89 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827 (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969)). 
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a basis for its decision, the Court used its prior case law on access to 
courts,90 based on Equal Protection and Due Process rights.91
The right created in Bounds was one for “meaningful” access to 
the courts for indigent prisoners, but the decision did not make clear 
how the states were supposed to provide it.92  The Court suggested 
the establishment of “adequate law libraries” but made clear that “al-
ternative means,” such as assistance from those trained in the law, 
were not only acceptable but also encouraged to help indigent pris-
oners achieve access.93
This right was relied on for nearly twenty years until the Su-
preme Court again reviewed the concept of law library access for 
prisoners in Lewis v. Casey94 and significantly narrowed its Bounds 
holding.  In Lewis, based largely on standing issues, the Court an-
nounced that Bounds did not establish an affirmative right to a law li-
brary or legal assistance: “[t]he right that Bounds acknowledged was 
the (already well-established) right of access to the courts.”95  The Court 
refuted any notion that Bounds created “an abstract, freestanding 
right to a law library or legal assistance,”96 and recast the right merely 
as a right to bring the grievance the prisoner wishes to present.97  In 
reframing this issue as the “right of access to the courts,”98 the Court 
briefly touched on non-English-speaking and illiterate criminal de-
fendants, and stated that prison officials need to provide them only 
with the capability to bring their claims while announcing an ex-
tremely deferential standard: “we leave it to prison officials to deter-
mine how best to ensure that inmates with language problems have a 
 90 Id. at 828–30. 
 91 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that 
the right articulated in Bounds has been described as a “consequence of due process, 
as an aspect of equal protection, or as an equal protection guarantee”) (internal qu-
otations and citations omitted). 
 92 John Matosky, Note, Illiterate Inmates and the Right of Meaningful Access to the 
Courts, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 295, 297 (1998). 
 93 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830–31. 
 94 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
 95 Id. at 350. 
 96 Id. at 351. 
 97 Id. at 354–55.  In reframing the issue, the Court noted that: 
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform them-
selves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from share-
holder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.  The tools it requires to 
be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their 
sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the condi-
tions of their confinement. 
Id. at 355. 
 98 Id. at 350. 
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reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims chal-
lenging their convictions or conditions of confinement.”99
The Court dismissed many of the claims, finding that the claims 
failed to allege “actual injury—that is, actual prejudice with respect to 
contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a fil-
ing deadline or to present a claim.”100  Where injury was shown on 
behalf of both the illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners, it 
was not “systemwide,” and, therefore, the injunctive relief re-
quested—a more effective law library system or assistance—was un-
reasonable and unnecessary.101
In addition, the Court required that any measure a state adopts 
to grant relief must comply with the reasonableness standard102 as set 
forth in Turner v. Safley.103  In examining prisoners’ rights to marry 
and to communicate with inmates in other prisons, Turner held that 
prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights “is valid 
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”104  The 
Court must look to the impact of how accommodating a prisoner’s 
constitutional right will burden the prison guards, the other inmates, 
and the prison’s resources.105  Only if an inmate can point to an al-
ternative solution that will further the right at “de minimis cost to valid 
penological interests” will the court find a violation of the reason-
ableness standard.106   
The final case that is necessary to understand Supreme Court ju-
risprudence on law library access is Kane v. Espitia,107 in which the 
Court held that there is no positive Sixth Amendment right to law li-
brary access for a pro se criminal defendant.108  The defendant in that 
case was seeking habeas corpus relief, which requires that the relief 
denied be “contrary to, or involv[e] an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States.”109  The Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, which, under Faretta v. California,110 provides for the 
 99 Id. at 356 (emphasis added). 
 100 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 101 Id. at 360. 
 102 Id. at 361. 
 103 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 104 Id. at 89. 
 105 Id. at 90. 
 106 Id. at 91. 
 107 546 U.S. 9 (2005). 
 108 Id. at 10. 
 109 Id. (citations omitted). 
 110 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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right to represent oneself, does not provide a positive right to access a 
law library.111  The Kane defendant relied solely upon Faretta,112 which 
in no way alludes to law library access.113  Because the defendant 
never raised the issue before the Court, the decision is silent on the 
“right of access to courts” standard as established by the interplay be-
tween Bounds and Lewis.114
The result of this jigsaw puzzle of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
is that there is no absolute right to law library access, as it was origi-
nally construed from Bounds.115  Lewis significantly narrowed Bounds 
by disclaiming its earlier holding regarding the right of law library ac-
cess,116 and Kane essentially ruled out a positive right to that access 
based on the Sixth Amendment.117  Although there is no positive 
right to law library access under Supreme Court jurisprudence, pris-
oners must still be capable of bringing their claims before the courts 
based on Lewis,118 subject to the reasonableness standard of Turner.119
IV. MENDOZA AND LEWIS:  
DENIAL OF THE CAPABILITY TO BRING ONE’S CLAIM  
SHOULD QUALIFY AS AN “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE” 
In Mendoza v. Carey,120 the Ninth Circuit held that the “combina-
tion of 1) a prison law library’s lack of Spanish-language legal materi-
als, and 2) a petitioner’s inability to obtain translation assistance be-
fore the one-year deadline, could constitute extraordinary 
circumstances.”121  In this prisoner’s case, there were “no Spanish 
books, no Spanish-English legal dictionaries, and no postings about 
the AEDPA time limitations in any language.”122  The court declared 
that the denial of those materials, along with the lack of any “other 
source” of translation, could constitute an extraordinary circum-
stance.123  The court then remanded the case for a factual finding as 
to whether the prisoner had exhausted all remedies available to him 
 111 Kane, 546 U.S. at 10. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Faretta, 422 U.S. 806. 
 114 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). 
 115 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). 
 116 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. 
 117 Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005). 
 118 518 U.S. at 350. 
 119 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 120 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 121 Id. at 1069. 
 122 Id. at 1067. 
 123 Id. at 1070. 
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in attempting to gather the other-language materials or assistance.124  
The Mendoza court applied the same rationale it had used in Wha-
lem/Hunt v. Early,125 where an English-speaking prisoner who had no 
access to any material, even a poster announcing the AEDPA one-year 
statute of limitations, could be granted equitable tolling if, in fact, he 
had asserted due diligence in pursuing his claim.126
The petitioner in Mendoza argued that during his first three 
months of incarceration he had requested materials but had been 
told that he would not be able to access any Spanish materials until 
he was transported to another prison.127  The petitioner also claimed 
that he visited the library at his second prison several times only to 
discover that there were no books, materials, or forms available in 
Spanish, nor were there Spanish-speaking clerks or librarians.128  
Based on this lack of access and assistance in his language, he 
claimed that he had no way to know that he needed to comply with 
the one-year statute of limitations.129  According to the petitioner, he 
was finally able to prepare any applications for post-conviction relief 
only by approaching inmates for assistance.130  Because the trial court 
dismissed the petition as untimely without an evidentiary hearing, the 
prisoner’s allegations could not be established.131  However, the Men-
doza court recognized that if the facts he alleged were true, this might 
qualify as the requisite due diligence necessary for equitable tolling.132
The Mendoza court immediately dismissed the notion that its de-
cision might appear to conflict with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Kane that there is no positive Sixth Amendment right to law library 
access.133  Careful not to contradict that decision, the Mendoza court 
refused to announce a positive right to law library access.134  As long 
as the prisoner is able to obtain access to materials or assistance in his 
 124 Id. at 1071. 
 125 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 126 Id. at 1147–48. 
 127 449 F.3d at 1067. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 1068. 
 130 Id. at 1067. 
 131 Id. at 1071. 
 132 Id. (“[H]e has alleged facts that, if true, may entitle him to equitable tolling.”). 
 133 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070 (“Our conclusion is completely consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision addressing law library access rights.”). 
 134 Id. at 1070 n.5 (“[W]e announce no rule affirmatively requiring that prisons 
provide legal materials in Spanish.”). 
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own language, including translation assistance from another pris-
oner, equitable tolling will not be available.135
The Mendoza court recognized and agreed with the Sixth Circuit 
decision in Cobas v. Burgess136 that the inability to understand English 
does not automatically justify equitable tolling.137  The court also 
agreed that the presence of a fellow inmate who can translate, read, 
and write English, and who assists petitioner in preparing his habeas 
petition, renders equitable tolling inapplicable.138
Although careful to avoid conflict with Kane, the Mendoza court 
failed to delve deeper into Supreme Court jurisprudence to provide a 
substantive justification for the equitable tolling.  As discussed above, 
Lewis provides that there is a right of access to courts and that prison-
ers must be provided the opportunity to bring their claims.139  By de-
nying non-English-speaking prisoners access to other-language legal 
materials, legal assistance, or translation, the prison authorities essen-
tially deprive prisoners of their ability to bring their claims in a timely 
manner, which, because of the strict ramifications of the AEDPA, 
prevents them from bringing their claims at all. 
This appears to be a Lewis violation and therefore could arguably 
offend the constitutional right of access to courts.140  If this violation 
is serious enough to amount to a constitutional violation, then it logi-
cally follows that this violation should automatically trigger equitable 
tolling because a constitutional violation is something out of the con-
trol of the prisoner that hindered his ability to obtain relief.141  In or-
der to prove a constitutional violation of the right of access to courts 
 135 Id. at 1070. 
 136 306 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 137 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. 
 138 Id. at 1069–70. 
 139 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). 
 140 Id. at 356.  The Court specifically addressed the scenario where an other-
language defendant is unable to bring his claim: 
When any inmate, even an illiterate or non-English-speaking inmate, 
shows that an actionable claim of this nature which he desired to bring 
has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is 
currently being prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not 
been provided, he demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish 
“adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 141 LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 217, 276 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Hubler v. Oritz, 190 
Fed. Appx. 727, 729 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the AEDPA limitations period is 
“subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances, such as where ‘a consti-
tutional violation [will] result[] in the conviction of one who is actually innocent or 
incompetent’”) (citations omitted). 
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set forth by Lewis, a prisoner would have to show that he had been ac-
tually injured by the prison’s actions or regulation—in other words, 
that he was prevented by the prison officials from bringing his claim 
before the court.142  A petitioner who does not speak any English and 
is deprived of law library materials or legal assistance in his own lan-
guage within the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations, despite his 
efforts to obtain them, is undoubtedly being denied access to courts.  
He would also have to prove that any remedy that might be instituted 
would pass the reasonableness test of Turner.143
Based on Lewis’s deference to prison officials and its require-
ment of compliance with the reasonableness standard in Turner,144 a 
prisoner who has been denied access to legal materials or assistance 
in his own language would be able to prove injury.145  It is question-
able, however, whether he might prove the widespread actual injury 
that would be required for the court to remedy the situation system-
wide by providing equal access to materials for all prisoners, no mat-
ter what language they speak.146  The government could argue that 
providing law library access or translation services for each other-
language prisoner, no matter what language he speaks, would be ex-
tremely cost-prohibitive.  The prison officials would not be required 
to take on such a cumbersome task based on Lewis’s deference to 
Turner.147  As long as the prison officials could argue that the impact 
on the prisons is too great to accommodate the right, prisoners would 
have a difficult time finding a “de minimis cost”148 solution to the lan-
guage barrier issue. 
A petitioner could argue, however, for cost-effective remedies 
that a court might consider.  For example, the prison libraries could 
provide limited Internet access to each prisoner and direct each to a 
webpage in his native language that would inform him of the statute 
of limitations.149  The prisons could also present each prisoner with a 
pamphlet explaining his rights under the AEDPA in his own lan-
 142 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. 
 143 Id. at 361. 
 144 Id. (“[A] prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights ‘is valid 
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”). 
 145 Id. at 356. 
 146 Id. at 359 (noting that two instances of injury were a “patently inadequate basis 
for a conclusion of systemwide violation and imposition of systemwide relief”). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987). 
 149 Titia A. Holtz, Note, Reaching Out from Behind Bars: The Constitutionality of Laws 
Barring Prisoners from the Internet, 67 BROOK L. REV. 855, 864 (2002) (discussing an In-
ternet-based education system implemented in Maryland through which students can 
earn a college degree while incarcerated). 
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guage.  Furthermore, the prison could implement a “language-
buddy” system, in which the prison could match each prisoner with a 
fellow inmate who would be available to translate from that prisoner’s 
language to English and help him prepare any claim he might 
have.150  Based on these alternative remedies, if widespread actual in-
jury exists, a court might provide the injunctive relief needed to rem-
edy the prisons’ denial of access to other-language prisoners. 
It is quite speculative, however, whether a court would indeed 
find for prisoners in this instance.  The Supreme Court announced 
that deference to prison officials would be a difficult obstacle for 
prisoners to overcome, despite creative remedies prisons could pro-
vide at a “de minimis cost.”151  In addition, the widespread actual injury 
requirement necessary to implement these changes implemented 
would indeed be difficult to face; not all other-language criminal de-
fendants speak the same language, and establishing a system to pro-
vide translation assistance or materials for each language would be 
burdensome.  A court would likely defer to the prison officials’ judg-
ment because accommodating every other-language prisoner’s needs 
would be a tremendous financial and administrative burden on the 
prison system. 
If a prisoner could not establish this widespread actual injury re-
quirement and could only establish that he had been individually in-
jured by the prison’s denial of his access, then he might have a slight 
chance at obtaining some relief under Lewis, but that, too, is ques-
tionable.  A prisoner attempting to argue for relief under the access-
to-courts theory would be at a loss, especially if he were arguing pro 
se, because Lewis does not provide a clearly defined right.  The Su-
preme Court summarily disposed of a pro se petitioner’s argument 
that he had been denied law library access simply because he had ar-
gued it on the wrong constitutional theory.152 Based on the Court’s 
treatment of the petitioner in Kane, even if a prisoner could argue for 
the access required under Lewis, it is unlikely that he would be suc-
cessful in overcoming the Turner reasonableness standard.153  Where a 
prisoner has been denied access to materials in his own language and 
has therefore been deprived of the chance to bring his claim within 
the necessary one-year AEDPA statute of limitations, there may be a 
 150 This could present some difficulties, however, due to the often adversarial na-
ture of the prisoner-to-prisoner relationship. 
 151 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
 152 Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9 (2005); see also supra notes 107–14 and accompa-
nying text. 
 153 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
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constitutional violation under Lewis.  The question remains whether a 
prisoner would be successful in presenting it to the court. 
The lesser standard for extraordinary circumstances, however, 
only requires that the petitioner show that for some reason beyond 
his control he was unable to file his claim by the one-year deadline.154  
In denying prisoners access to AEDPA materials or assistance in their 
own language, prison officials are denying other-language prisoners 
the capability to bring their grievances to court.  While this might 
serve as a constitutional argument under Lewis, the denial of that ac-
cess could more easily satisfy the lesser standard of an extraordinary 
circumstance that would entitle a defendant to equitable tolling.  A 
prisoner who is unaware of a statute of limitations because he was re-
fused help in a language he can understand cannot know that he has 
missed the one-year deadline and his only chance to bring his 
claim.155
Equally important to the extraordinary circumstances analysis is 
whether, in fact, the prisoner has exercised reasonable diligence in 
pursuing his claim.156  What this means for an other-language defen-
dant is unclear because the Mendoza court was the first to recognize 
that denial of access to an other-language defendant might be con-
sidered an extraordinary circumstance.157  Nevertheless, the Mendoza 
court determined that the petitioner in that case, if the facts he al-
leged were true, might well have satisfied the due diligence stan-
dard.158  The petitioner had inquired at both prisons’ libraries, within 
the first few months, about other-language materials.159  He had also 
enlisted the assistance of two inmates in preparing both his state 
claim, which was denied as untimely, and his habeas petition.160
An other-language prisoner asserting due diligence might there-
fore have to prove, first, that there were no materials or assistance in 
his language available to alert him of the AEDPA.  He would also 
have to establish that he inquired of the prison officials and the 
 154 Aaron G. McCollough, For Whom the Court Tolls: Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA 
Statute of Limitations in Capital Habeas Cases, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 385 (2005).  
Equitable tolling has been granted in situations such as where prison officials failed 
to mail a defendant’s petition, where the defendant was able to prove “actual inno-
cence,” or where the defendant was mentally incompetent at the time of trial.  Id. at 
384. 
 155 Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 156 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 
 157 See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text. 
 158 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071. 
 159 Id. at 1067. 
 160 Id. at 1067–68. 
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prison libraries  whether other-language materials were available, at 
least within the first few months, to establish that he had not been sit-
ting on his claim.  It is questionable whether he might have to file a 
formal complaint with the prison to satisfy the requirement of admin-
istrative exhaustion,161 as his attempt to do so in a language he did 
not understand would likely be futile and thus exempt from exhaus-
tion requirements.162  He might also have to prove that he was unable 
to receive assistance from other inmates, either because he was un-
able to become familiar with inmates who spoke his own language 
and were able to read, write, and speak English (whether due to so-
cial or administrative separation), or because there were no inmates 
present at the facility who could meet those standards.  Once the pe-
titioner establishes this requisite due diligence, and he has already 
proven that his inability to obtain translation assistance or materials 
in his own language was out of his control, he may be entitled to eq-
uitable tolling of the AEDPA based on the extraordinary circum-
stances test.163
For the analysis of the extraordinary circumstances standard to 
come full circle, it is important also to distinguish Kane.164  The Men-
doza court quickly dismissed any appearance of a facial conflict with 
the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Kane that there is no free-
standing Sixth Amendment right of a pro se defendant to access a law 
library.165  The Kane Court, however, determined whether there was a 
“clearly established” federal right that had been violated for purposes 
of habeas relief.166  While Lewis’s right of access to courts might pro-
vide viable grounds for relief for a prisoner who has been denied law 
library access or legal assistance that has thus prevented him from 
bringing a claim,167 Kane is silent on this issue for the simple reason 
that it was never raised by the petitioner.168  Regardless of whether 
denial of law library access or other assistance in one’s own language 
 161 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006), pro-
vides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under sec-
tion 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are avail-
able are exhausted.” 
 162 Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (noting 
that the doctrine of exhaustion contains an exception which permits early review 
when exhaustion would prove “futile”). 
 163 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071. 
 164 Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9 (2005). 
 165 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. 
 166 Kane, 546 U.S. at 9. 
 167 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). 
 168 Id. 
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would create a ground for habeas relief, the standard for equitable 
tolling—“the presence of an extraordinary circumstance and the in-
mate’s exercise of diligence”169—is significantly different from the 
“clearly established” federal right that is required for habeas relief.170  
A prisoner need not allege a constitutional violation in order to gain 
equitable tolling; he needs merely to assert some circumstance that 
was beyond his control that prevented him, despite his diligence, 
from pursuing his claim.171
Because of this difference in legal standards, the fact that Kane 
specifically denies a positive Sixth Amendment right to law library ac-
cess is non-dispositive.172  A grant of more time in which a prisoner 
might file a habeas petition based on his law library access would not 
undermine Kane’s holding.  Furthermore, it would reaffirm Lewis’s 
notion that every petitioner must be able to bring his claim.173  Based 
on the gravity of the violation—that there could be a constitutional 
violation of the right of access to courts under Lewis—the situation 
should qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance.”174
While Lewis does not establish a positive right to law library ac-
cess, and Kane refuses to announce one for a pro se defendant, a de-
fendant nonetheless must be provided the capability to bring his 
claim.175  Denial of access to law library materials or legal assistance in 
a prisoner’s own language within the one-year period effectively pre-
vents him from bringing his claim for wrongful imprisonment before 
a federal court.  This inability to bring a claim, despite his efforts, 
should qualify for equitable relief under the AEDPA, even if a court 
were reluctant to find a Lewis violation of access to courts. 
This grant of equitable tolling would not place an additional 
burden on the prison system and would thus comply with Turner’s 
standard.  In the case of a habeas petitioner who requests equitable 
tolling, it is because his habeas petition has been summarily denied.176  
This means that the prisoner has already obtained assistance or mate-
rials and has attempted to prepare his claim, but the court has denied 
him the chance to be heard.177  His claim is arguably ripe, and once 
 169 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071 n.6. 
 170 Kane, 546 U.S. at 9. 
 171 McCollough, supra note 154, at 385. 
 172 Kane, 546 U.S. at 9. 
 173 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). 
 174 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071. 
 175 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. 
 176 Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1068 (“[T]he magistrate judge recommended that Men-
doza’s habeas petition be dismissed as untimely.”). 
 177 Id. 
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granted the equitable tolling he may bring the claim before the court 
for his chance at habeas relief.  The equitable tolling, therefore, 
would not place an additional burden on the prison system in which 
the petitioner is incarcerated. 
The intent of the AEDPA was to prevent abuse of habeas corpus 
filings.178  A prisoner who has had no chance to bring a claim because 
he was unable to learn of the statute of limitations cannot be accused 
of abusing habeas corpus proceedings if he pursued his rights dili-
gently.  Any delay would be out of his control, and once he is ready to 
present his claim he should not be punished for a failure on the part 
of the prison system to provide him the capability to bring his claim.  
While there would be a slight burden on the court to determine fac-
tually whether the petitioner was pursuing his rights, this is not be-
cause the petitioner has committed any wrongdoing.  When the peti-
tioner is able to bring his claim before the court after the provision of 
equitable tolling, the court will provide the function it would have 
had the claimant been capable of bringing his claim within the one-
year AEDPA deadline: access to justice for the petitioner. 
V. THE ROLE OF THE GREAT WRIT 
CALLS FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING 
In addition to a possible violation of Lewis’s right of access to the 
courts as an extraordinary circumstance requiring equitable tolling of 
the AEDPA, the harshness of the AEDPA and the importance of the 
Great Writ to our criminal justice system call for this relief.  Even if 
the cost-prohibitive nature of providing access to law library materials 
or legal assistance to other-language criminal defendants in their own 
languages were to undermine the argument based on Lewis’s right of 
access to courts, several policy reasons surrounding the writ of habeas 
corpus and the severe sanctions of violating the AEDPA call for equi-
table tolling: the Great Writ’s role as a remedy of last resort for pris-
oners who have been unconstitutionally incarcerated,179 the harsh 
and unforgiving nature of the AEDPA,180 and the inherent inability to 
provide equal access to justice for prisoners who do not understand 
English.181
Because the Great Writ originated as, and continues to be, the 
last resort for prisoners to obtain relief in our criminal justice sys-
 178 H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 179 Sessions, supra note 10, at 1515. 
 180 See supra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
 181 Rearick, supra note 3, at 543. 
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tem,182 providing the chance to bring a petition for habeas corpus to 
each and every defendant is necessary to maintain our ideals of jus-
tice.  If a prisoner is being incarcerated because of a constitutional 
violation that occurred during his trial, he has a right to be heard, re-
gardless of what language he speaks.  The AEDPA significantly curbs 
that right. 
Imagine a prisoner without a high school education attempting 
to discern when the one-year statute of limitations is triggered, and 
when it is tolled, and whether his state application for post-conviction 
relief has been “properly filed.”183  Now imagine that same person 
does not speak, read, write, or understand a word of English.  That 
person may not know that his constitutional rights were violated in a 
lower court.  But assuming that he does, and assuming that he knows 
he is entitled to some sort of remedy, how is he supposed to obtain 
that remedy if the prison does not furnish him with any materials or 
assistance in a language that he can understand?  If this person none-
theless attempts “diligently”184 to obtain materials or assistance from 
the prison to no avail, is it fair to fault him procedurally for some-
thing that was completely out of his control?  After the one-year pe-
riod has passed, and he is finally able to file his claim, possibly with 
help from another inmate or from family or friends on the outside, is 
it fair to tell him that he missed the deadline and that he will remain 
incarcerated, regardless of the constitutional violation, for the rest of 
his sentence? 
The AEDPA is harsh.  The AEDPA is complicated.  Although 
common sense would dictate that the hypothetical, non-English-
speaking prisoner receive a chance at habeas relief after he has 
jumped numerous hurdles to even file the petition, in reality, deny-
ing him his last chance to challenge his imprisonment is inequitable.  
As noted above, other courts have refused to hold that a language 
barrier is enough to constitute an extraordinary circumstance to toll 
the AEDPA statute of limitations.185  Mendoza is the first court to rec-
ognize that a language barrier, combined with the inability to pro-
cure other-language materials or assistance, could be construed as an 
extraordinary circumstance, and, if the petitioner exhibits the requi-
 182 Sessions, supra note 10, at 1515.  See also Benjamin R. Orye, Note, The Failure of 
Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a 
Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 441, 484 (Oct. 2002) (“The writ of habeas corpus, the Great Writ, is the 
last resort of those who have been wrongly imprisoned.”). 
 183 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006). 
 184 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 
 185 See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text. 
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site diligence, he may be entitled to equitable relief. 186  The underly-
ing purpose of the AEDPA was to prevent abuse of the habeas corpus 
system and to promote judicial efficiency.187  It was not intended to 
categorically deprive non-English-speaking criminal defendants of 
the right to bring a habeas petition.  But that has been the effect for 
many prisoners. 
The purpose of the Great Writ is to free those wrongly impris-
oned.188 That venerable purpose is undermined not only by the 
harsh, complicated, and unforgiving provisions of the AEDPA but 
also by courts’ reluctance to recognize a language barrier as an ex-
traordinary circumstance when a defendant cannot obtain the mate-
rials or assistance he needs to file a petition to challenge his wrongful 
imprisonment.189  By affording other-language criminal defendants 
the opportunity to be heard in court, assuming they have diligently 
pursued their claims, equitable tolling of the AEDPA in this circum-
stance brings the Great Writ back to its purpose of ensuring access to 
justice. 
While it is not guaranteed that other-language prisoners will be 
able to prevail on their habeas corpus claims, it is necessary that they 
at least have the chance to present their grievances to the court.  
Once in court, the petitioner is afforded two protections: a court 
translator through which he may present the facts of his case190 and 
the court’s application of “less stringent standards” by which it ana-
lyzes petitioner’s claim when he appears pro se. 191  A prisoner who 
has been afforded equitable tolling of his habeas petition based upon 
his inability to access other language materials, but who has been able 
through some other means to file his habeas petition, will be on near-
equal footing with any other English-speaking petitioner.  It is a small 
step to afford this class of prisoners equitable tolling.  Offering that 
prisoner the initial access to the court and the opportunity to present 
the facts of his case is the only requirement for a petitioner such as 
Mendoza to effectively pursue a habeas corpus petition. 
 186 449 F.3d 1065, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 187 H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 188 Sessions, supra note 10, at 1514. 
 189 See, e.g., Perez v. Sherrer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16575 at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 
2006); Perez v. Johnson, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23727 at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 
2001). 
 190 Federal Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2006). 
 191 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Mendoza v. Carey has provided a new avenue through which oth-
er-language defendants might be able to bring their federal habeas 
corpus claims that were previously time-barred.192  Other circuit 
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have yet to recognize the 
inability to procure legal materials or assistance in one’s own lan-
guage as an “extraordinary circumstance” that would entitle a pris-
oner who has exerted due diligence in pursuing his claim to equita-
ble tolling.193  Based on Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the 
right to access courts, prisons are essentially denying other-language 
criminal defendants the capability to bring their claims, and thus eq-
uitable tolling is necessary to remedy this violation.  Despite Kane’s 
denial of a Sixth Amendment right to law library access for a pro se 
defendant,194 Lewis still stands as good law on the right of access to 
courts and the principle that, based on Equal Protection and Due 
Process grounds,195 a state must provide a criminal defendant with the 
capability to bring his claim to court.196
Lewis provides that the state, at the minimum, may not deprive a 
prisoner of the capability of bringing his claim.197  It follows that when 
a prisoner is actively trying to file a petition of habeas corpus but is 
unable to do so because of his inability to procure materials or assis-
tance in his own language at a state facility, a state must confer the 
capability through those other materials or assistance for him to 
bring his habeas petition to court.  While Mendoza does not rely on 
Lewis’s right of access to courts, it does recognize that this is an ex-
traordinary circumstance out of the prisoner’s control for the pur-
pose of equitable tolling.198  Because Lewis requires that a prisoner be 
able to present his claim,199 it makes perfect sense that a state that 
does not provide access to the necessary assistance by which a non-
English-speaking criminal defendant may bring the claim creates ex-
actly the extraordinary circumstance that was envisioned for the pur-
 192 See 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 193 See, e.g., Perez, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16575 at *17; Perez, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23727 at *12. 
 194 Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9 (2005). 
 195 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 196 Id. at 350. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 199 518 U.S. at 350. 
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poses of equitable tolling.200  Providing other-language criminal de-
fendants with equitable tolling would then provide them with the ca-
pability to bring their claims in court and thus satisfy Lewis.201
In addition to the right of access to courts, the importance of the 
Great Writ as the “last hope”202 for criminal defendants to obtain re-
lief from an unconstitutional incarceration calls for equitable tolling 
in an extraordinary circumstance such as this.  Because an other-
language criminal defendant has no chance to know of the AEDPA 
unless he has access to legal materials or assistance in his own lan-
guage to explain it, there is no reason for him to suffer its harsh con-
sequence.  If a non-English-speaking defendant loses his claim be-
cause he was not able to receive meaningful assistance, principles of 
equity require that he be able to bring his claim so long as he pur-
sued it diligently.  Once a prisoner is able to know simply of the exis-
tence of the AEDPA, perhaps then it would be fair to subject him to 
it.  But for a prisoner who cannot understand English, let alone the 
law itself, we are depriving him of a chance at freedom based solely 
on a procedural technicality.  The other circuits, along with the Su-
preme Court, should adopt the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Men-
doza v. Carey—that a non-English-speaking criminal defendant should 
be entitled to equitable tolling based on his diligence in pursuing his 
claim and on the extraordinary circumstance that he was denied ac-
cess to legal materials or assistance in his own language.203
 200 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (equitable tolling granted when 
the petitioner “has been pursuing his rights diligently” and “some extraordinary cir-
cumstance stood in his way”). 
 201 See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. 
 202 Sessions, supra note 10, at 1514. 
 203 449 F.3d 1065, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2006). 
